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a b s t r a c t
We study the Hospitals/Residents with Couples problem, a variant of the classical Stable
Marriage problem. This is the extension of the Hospitals/Residents problem where resi-
dents are allowed to formpairs and submit joint rankings over hospitals.We use the frame-
work of parameterized complexity, considering the number of couples as a parameter. We
also apply a local search approach, and examine the possibilities for giving FPT algorithms
applicable in this context. Furthermore, we also investigate thematching problem contain-
ing couples that is the simplified version of the Hospitals/Residents with Couples problem
modeling the case when no preferences are given.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The classical Hospitals/Residents problem (which is a generalization of the well-known Stable Marriage problem) was
introduced by Gale and Shapley [1] to model the following situation. We are given a set of hospitals, each having a number
of open positions, and a set of residents applying for jobs in the hospitals. Each resident has a ranking over the hospitals, and
conversely, each hospital has a ranking over the residents. Our aim is to assign as many residents to a hospital as possible,
with the restrictions that the capacities of the hospitals are not exceeded and the resulting assignment is stable. Stability
will be formally defined in Section 3, but essentially an assignment is unstable, if there is a hospital h and a resident r such
that r is not assigned to h, but both h and r would benefit from contracting with each other instead of accepting the given
assignment.
The original version of the Hospitals/Residents problem is well understood: a stable assignment always exists, and every
stable assignment has the same size. (The size of an assignment is the number of residents that have a job.) Moreover, the
classical Gale–Shapley algorithm [1] can find a stable assignment in linear time. However, several practical applicationsmo-
tivate some kind of extension or modification of the problem (see e.g. the NRMP program for assigning medical residents in
the USA [2,3] or the detailing process of the US Navy [4]), and in the recent decade various versions have been investigated.
Among the most frequently studied variants are the case when preference lists involve ties and may be incomplete [5,6],
the case when the market of the agents is one-sided, called the Stable Roommates problem [7,8], and the case when the
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Table 1
Summary of our results (assuming W[1] ≠ FPT).
Task: Existence problem Maximum problem Local search algorithm with FPT running time
Parameter: |C | |C | ℓ (|C |, ℓ)
Without preferences P (trivial) Randomized FPT (Theorem 1) No permissive alg. (Theorem 7) Permissive alg. (Theorem 1)
With preferences No FPT alg. (Theorem 8) No FPT alg. (Theorem 8) No permissive alg. (Theorem 10) Strict alg. (Theorem 11)
assignment may be a many-to-many matching [9–11]. Here we study an extension of this problem, called Hospitals/
Residents with Couples, where residents may form couples, and thus have joint rankings over the hospitals. This exten-
sion models a situation that arises in many real world applications [3,12], and was first introduced by Roth [2] who also
discovered that a stable assignment need not exist when couples are involved. Later, Ronn [13] proved that it is NP-hard to
decide whether a stable assignment exists in such a setting. Since then, various approaches have been investigated to deal
with the intractability of this problem, but most researchers examined different assumptions on the preferences of couples
that guarantee some kind of tractability [14–17].
For the investigation of this problem, we use the framework of parameterized complexity which has been developed
by Downey and Fellows [18]. This approach deals with hard problems, where polynomial-time algorithms are unlikely to
exist. To do this, we define an integer parameter k for each problem instance, and we try to find algorithms whose running
time remains tractable if the parameter k is small. More precisely, we look for algorithms whose running time is of the form
f (k)nc , where n is the size of the instance having parameter k, f is an arbitrary function, and c is a constant. Note that the
running time may depend exponentially or worse on the parameter k, but it yields a polynomial of degree c for each fixed
k. Problems admitting such an algorithm are called fixed-parameter tractable or FPT.
Up to our knowledge, no version of the Hospitals/Residents problem has been studied from the parameterized point
of view. When considering Hospitals/Residents with Couples, the number of couples in an instance can be a natural
parameter. We prove the negative result of Theorem 8 stating that deciding the existence of a stable assignment for the
Hospitals/Residents with Couples problem is not FPT, provided that W[1] ≠ FPT holds (which is a standard assumption of
parameterized complexity theory).
Local search is a basic technique that has beenwidely applied in heuristics for practical optimization problems for several
decades [19]. However, investigations considering the connection of local search and parameterized algorithms have only
been started a few years ago, and research in this area has been gaining increasing attention lately [20]. The basic idea of
local search is to find an optimal solution by an iteration in which we improve the current solution step by step through
local modifications. Local search can become more efficient if we can decide whether there exists a better solution S ′ that
is ℓmodification steps away from a given solution S. Typically, the ℓ-neighborhood of a solution S can be explored in nO(ℓ)
time by examining all possibilities to find those parts of S that should be modified. (Here n is the input size.) However, in
some cases the dependency on ℓ can be improved by getting ℓ out of the exponent of n, resulting in a running time of the
form f (ℓ)nc for some constant c , meaning that the neighborhood exploration problem is FPT. This question has already been
studied in connection with different optimization problems [21–23].
In Theorem 11, we give an algorithm for the following problem: given a stable assignment S, find a stable assignment S ′
of greater size which can be obtained from S by modifying the assignment for at most ℓ residents. The presented algorithm
guesses the structure of the modification needed to obtain the larger stable assignment S ′, and applies color-coding to
localize this structure step by step in the original instance, using only simple steps. The running time of this algorithm
for an instance of size n involving a set C of couples is f (ℓ, |C |)nc for some function f and constant c , so this yields an FPT
algorithm with parameters ℓ and |C |. In contrast, if we only regard ℓ as a parameter, then Theorem 10 shows that no FPT
algorithm exists for this problem unlessW [1]= FPT.
We also contribute to the framework of parameterized local search algorithms by distinguishing between ‘‘strict’’
algorithms that perform the local search step in some neighborhood of a solution as described above, and ‘‘permissive’’
algorithmswhose task is the following: given some problemwith an initial solution S, find any better solution, provided that
a better solution exists in the local neighborhood of S. Ourmotivation for this distinction is that finding an improved solution
in the neighborhood of a given solution may be hard, even for problems where an optimal solution is easily found. We hope
that this differentiation clarifies the role of local search in such cases, helping the parameterized complexity analysis of such
problems.
Most of the questions examined here are also worth studying in a model that does not involve preferences. This
simplification leads to a matching problem that we call MaximumMatching with Couples. Using a result by the first author
concerning matroids from the parameterized view-point [24], we propose a randomized algorithm in Theorem 1 that finds
a matching of maximum size, and runs in FPT time if the parameter is the number |C | of couples. Therefore, this problem
becomes easier without preferences. By contrast, the local search problem still remains hard to solve (Theorem 7). For a
summary of our results see Table 1.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 covers our notation and the preliminaries, and Section 3 introduces the formal
definitions of the problems examined in the paper. In Section 4, we investigate the Matching with Couples problem, and we
present our results on the Hospitals/Residents with Couples problem in Section 5. Finally, we give a short summary of our
results in Section 6.
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2. Preliminaries
For some integer k, we use [k] = {1, 2, . . . , k}, and

[k]
2

= {(i, j) | 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k}. For a graph G, V (G) denotes its
vertices and E(G) its edges. A matching in G is a set M of edges such that no two edges in M share an endpoint. If x is an
endpoint of some edge inM , then x is covered byM . For some x covered byM ,M(x) = y if xy ∈ M .
A decision problem Q over some alphabetΣ is an arbitrary subset ofΣ∗, and an algorithm decides Q if for every x ∈ Σ∗,
its output is ‘Yes’ if and only if x ∈ Q . With each instance of an optimization problem Q we associate a set of solutions and
an objective function which we want to maximize or minimize. In this paper we consider only maximization problems.
Parameterized complexity. A parameterized problem is a pair (Q , κ)where Q ⊆ Σ∗ is a decision problem over some alphabet
Σ , and κ : Σ∗ → N is a parameterization of the problem, assigning a parameter to each instance of Q . An algorithm is
fixed-parameter tractable or FPT, if its running time is f (k)|I|c for some computable function f , where I is the input, k is the
parameter and c is a constant. A parameterized problem is FPT, if there is an FPT algorithm that decides it. Analogously to
the classical complexity theory, the theory ofW [1]-hardness can be used to prove that some problem is not FPT, unless the
widely believed FPT ⊂ W[1] conjecture fails. Given two parameterized problems (Q1, κ1) and (Q2, κ2) over the alphabetΣ ,
an FPT reduction from (Q1, κ1) to (Q2, κ2) is a function g : Σ∗ → Σ∗, computable by an FPT algorithm, such that I ∈ Q1 if
and only if g(I) ∈ Q2 and κ2(g(I)) ≤ f (κ1(I)) for some computable function f , for every I ∈ Σ∗. To prove W [1]-hardness
results, we use that the class of W [1]-hard problems is closed under FPT reductions. The FPT reductions in this paper are
from theW [1]-hard parameterized problem Clique, in which a graph G and a parameter k is given, and the task is to decide
whether there is a clique of size k in G. For further details on parameterized complexity, see e.g. [18,25], or [26].
Local search. To formalize the task of a local search algorithm, let Q be an optimization problem with an objective function
T which we want to maximize. To define the concept of neighborhoods, we suppose there is some distance d(x, y) defined
for each pair (x, y) of solutions for some instance I of Q . We say that x is ℓ-close to y if d(x, y) ≤ ℓ. The input of a local search
algorithm forQ is an instance I ofQ , a solution S0 for I , and an integer ℓ. A strict local search algorithm forQ has the following
task:
Strict local search for Q
Input: (I, S0, ℓ)where I is an instance of Q , S0 is a solution for I , and ℓ ∈ N.
Task: If there exists a solution S for I such that d(S, S0) ≤ ℓ and T (S) > T (S0), then output such an S.
In contrast, a permissive local search algorithm for Q is allowed to output a solution that is not close to S0, provided that it
is better than S0. In local search methods, such an algorithm is as useful as its strict version. Formally, its task is as follows:
Permissive local search for Q
Input: (I, S0, ℓ)where I is an instance of Q , S0 is a solution for I , and ℓ ∈ N.
Task: If there exists a solution S for I such that d(S, S0) ≤ ℓ and T (S) > T (S0), then output any solution S ′ for I with
T (S ′) > T (S).
On the one hand, note that if an optimal solution can be found by some algorithm, then this yields a permissive local
search algorithm for the given problem. On the other hand, finding a strict local search algorithm might be hard even if an
optimal solution is easily found. An example for such a case is theMinimumVertex Cover problem for bipartite graphs [22].
Besides, proving that no permissive local search algorithm exists for some problem is clearly more relevant than proving
that no strict local search algorithm exists for it (having a certain running time). We also present results of this kind.
We remark that the distinction between permissive and strict local search algorithms cannot be maintained when
addressing the standard decision version of these problems. To see this, consider the following formulation of such a local
search problem: given an instance I of someoptimization problemQ , a solution S0 to I , and some ℓ ∈ N, decidewhether there
is a solution S for I such that d(S, S0) ≤ ℓ and T (S) > T (S0). Clearly, the difference between the strict and the permissive
approach is no longer applicable in this definition. Consequently, instead of provingW [1]-hardness for problems considering
local search algorithms, our hardness results will be formulated as statements that no (permissive) local search algorithm
can run in FPT time with a certain parameterization, assuming FPT ≠ W[1].
3. Problem definitions
In this section we give the formal descriptions of the different models that we investigate.
Model without preferences. First, we define two versions of the Hospitals/Residents problem that involve couples, but do not
deal with preferences, using only a notion of acceptability instead.
A couples’ market with acceptance, or cma for short, consists of a set S of singles, a set C of couples, a set H of hospitals
together with a capacity f (h) for each hospital h, a set A(s) ⊆ H for each single s ∈ S representing acceptable hospitals for s,
and a set A(c) ⊆ H for each couple c ∈ C representing acceptable hospital pairs for c. HereH = (H ∪ {⊘}) × (H ∪ {⊘}) \
{(⊘,⊘)}where⊘ is a special symbol indicating that someone is unemployed. If f ≡ f0 for some f0 ∈ N, thenwe say that the
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cma is f0-uniform. Each couple c is a pair (c(1), c(2)), and we call the elements of the set R =c∈C {c(1), c(2)}∪ S residents.
The couples are mutually disjoint, i.e. each resident appears in at most one couple.
An assignment for a cma (S, C,H, f , A) is a function M : R → H ∪ {⊘} such that M(s) ∈ A(s) ∪ {⊘} for each s ∈ S,
M(c) ∈ A(c) ∪ {(⊘,⊘)} for each c ∈ C , and the number of residents assigned to a hospital h is at most its capacity f (h).
Here, M(c) denotes the pair (M(a),M(b)) for some couple c = (a, b), and the set of residents assigned to h in M is the set
{r | r ∈ R,M(r) = h}, denoted by M(h). We say that an assignment M covers a resident r if M(r) ≠ ⊘, and M covers a
couple c , if it covers c(1) or c(2). We define the size ofM , denoted by |M|, to be the number of residents covered byM . The
MaximumMatching with Couples problem is an optimization problem, where given a cma I , the set of solutions is the set
of assignments for I , and the task is to find an assignment for I of maximum size.
To consider the local search versions of theMaximumMatchingwith Couples problem, we define the distance d(M,M ′)
of two assignments M and M ′ for some cma I as the number of residents r for which M(r) ≠ M ′(r). Using this, the task
of a strict local search algorithm for Maximum Matching with Couples is the following: given a cma I together with an
assignment M for I , and some integer ℓ, find an assignment M ′ for I with d(M,M ′) ≤ ℓ that has size greater than M . The
input of a permissive local search algorithm forMaximum Matching with Couples is the same, but in this case the task is
to find any assignment for I having size greater thanM , if such an assignment exists in the ℓ-neighborhood ofM .
Model with preferences. Next, let us define some versions of the Hospitals/Residents problem, where couples are involved
and preferences play an important role.
A couples’ market with preference, or cmp for short, consists of the sets S, C , and H representing singles, couples, and
hospitals, respectively, a capacity f (h) for each h ∈ H , and a preference list L(a) for each a ∈ S ∪C ∪H . The set A = S ∪C ∪H
is called the set of agents. The preference lists can be incomplete, but cannot involve ties, so if s ∈ S then L(s) is a strictly
ordered set of hospitals, if c ∈ C then L(c) is a strictly ordered subset ofH , and if h ∈ H then L(h) is a strictly ordered set of
residents. Here,H and the symbol ⊘ are defined the same way as for the case without preferences, and we also adopt the
notion of f0-uniformity. The set of elements appearing in the list L(a) is AL(a), andwe say that x is acceptable for a if x ∈ AL(a).
Clearly, we may assume that acceptance is mutual, so h ∈ AL(s) holds if and only if s ∈ AL(h) for each s ∈ S and h ∈ H , and
(h1, h2) ∈ AL(c) implies c(i) ∈ AL(hi) or hi = ⊘ for both i ∈ {1, 2}, for each c ∈ C . For some x ∈ AL(a), the rank of xw.r.t. a,
denoted by ρ(a, x), is r ∈ N if x is the r-th element in L(a). If x ∉ AL(a), then we let ρ(a, x) = ∞ for all meaningful x.
Let I = (S, C,H, f , L) be a cmp. An assignment for I is an assignment for the underlying cma (S, C,H, f , AL). We say that
x is beneficial for the agent awith respect to an assignmentM if x ∈ AL(a) and one of the following cases holds: (1) a ∈ S ∪ C
and either a is not covered by M or ρ(a, x) < ρ(a,M(a)), (2) a ∈ H and either |M(a)| < f (a) or there exists a resident
r ′ ∈ M(h) such that ρ(a, x) < ρ(a, r ′). A blocking pair forM can be of three types:
– it is either a pair formed by a single s and a hospital h such that both s and h are beneficial for each other w.r.t.M ,
– or a pair formed by a couple c and a pair (h1, h2)with h1 ≠ h2 such that (h1, h2) is beneficial for c w.r.t.M , and for both
i ∈ {1, 2} it holds that if hi ≠ ⊘ then either c(i) is beneficial for hi w.r.t.M or c(i) ∈ M(hi),
– or a pair formed by a couple c and a hospital h such that (h, h) is beneficial for c w.r.t.M , and the couple c is beneficial for
h. If h prefers c(1) to c(2), this latter means that either |M(h)| ≤ f (h)− 2, or |M(h)| ≤ f (h)− 1 and ρ(h, c(1)) < ρ(h, r)
for some r ∈ M(h), or ρ(h, c(1)) < ρ(h, r1) and ρ(h, c(2)) < ρ(h, r2) for some r1 ≠ r2 inM(h).1
An assignmentM for I is stable if there is no blocking pair forM .
The input of the Hospitals/Residents with Couples problem is a cmp I , and the task is to determine a stable assignment
for I , if such an assignment exists. We denote by Maximum Hospitals/Residents with Couples the optimization problem
where the task is to determine a stable assignment of maximum size for a given cmp. Another variant of this optimization
problem which we will address is the Increase Hospitals/Residents with Couples problem. Here, the input is a cmp I and
a stable assignmentM0 for I , and the task is to find a stable assignment with size at least |M0| + 1.
4. Matching without preferences
In this section we investigate the parameterized complexity of the Maximum Matching with Couples problem. In
Section 4.1 we present a randomized FPT algorithm for it, where the parameter is the number of couples. Then we turn
our attention to an application of this algorithm in the context of scheduling problems in Section 4.2. We also examine the
possibility of finding a local search algorithm for theMaximumMatching with Couples problem in Section 4.3.
4.1. Fixed-parameter tractability
Let us examine the complexity of the Maximum Matching with Couples problem. Clearly, if there are no couples in a
given instance, then the problem is equivalent to finding a maximum matching in a bipartite graph, and can be solved by
standard techniques. If couples are involved, the problembecomes hard.More precisely, the decision version of this problem
is NP-complete [27,28], even in the special case where each hospital has a capacity of 2, and the acceptable hospital pairs
for a couple are always of the form (h, h) for some h ∈ H . However, if the number of couples is small, which is a reasonable
assumption in many practical applications,MaximumMatching with Couples becomes tractable, as shown by Theorem 1.
1 We thank David Manlove for pointing out this case.
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Theorem 1. MaximumMatching with Couples can be solved in randomized FPT time with parameter |C |.
We will use the following lemma to solve a special case of theMaximumMatching with Couples problem.
Lemma 2. There exists an algorithm running in randomized FPT time with parameter |C | that, given an instance of the 1-uniform
Maximum Matching with Couples problem and some integer n, finds an assignment covering at least n singles and also each
resident that is a member of some couple, if such an assignment exists.
To prove Lemma 2, we need some results from [24] concerning matroids.
Although we only use basic concepts from matroid theory, here we give a brief outline of the main definitions used. For
some set U and collection I ⊆ 2U , the pair (U, I) is amatroid if the following hold: (1) ∅ ∈ I, (2) if X ∈ I and X ′ ⊆ X then
X ′ ∈ I, and (3) if X, Y ∈ I and |X | < |Y | then X ∪ {y} ∈ I for some y ∈ Y \ X . The elements of I are called independent
sets. A matrix A over a field F is a linear representation of a matroid ({ui | i ∈ [n]}, I), if for any set J of indices in [n], the set
of columns in A corresponding to the indices J are independent over F if and only if {uj | j ∈ J} ∈ I. A matroid is linear if it
admits a linear representation. Amaximal independent set of a matroid is called a basis of thematroid. The dual of a matroid
(U, I)with basis setB is the matroid with ground set U whose basis set is {U \ B | B ∈ B}. The k-truncation of (U, I) is the
matroid (U, I′) where I ∈ I′ if and only if I ∈ I and |I| ≤ k. Given a bipartite graph G(A, B; E), its transversal matroid has
ground set A, and X is defined to be independent if there is a matching in G covering X .
Theorem 3 ([24]). Let M(U, I) be a linear matroid where the ground set U is partitioned into blocks of size b. Given a linear
representation A of M, it can be determined in f (k, b) · ‖A‖O(1) randomized time whether there is an independent set that is the
union of k blocks. (‖A‖ denotes the length of A in the input.)
The following generalization of Theorem 3 will be convenient for our purposes.
Corollary 4. Let M(U, I) be a linear matroid and let X = {X1, X2, . . . , Xn} be a collection of subsets of U, each of size b. Given
a linear representation A of M, it can be determined in f (k, b) · ‖A‖O(1) randomized time whether there is an independent set
that is the union of k disjoint sets inX.
Proof. First, let us make n(u) copies for each u ∈ U , where n(u) is the number of sets inX containing u, i.e. let U ′ = {ui |
u ∈ U, n(u) > 0, i ∈ [n(u)]}. LetM′(U ′, I′) be the matroid where I′ contains those sets which can be obtained from some
set I ∈ I by replacing each u ∈ I with an arbitrary element from {ui | i ∈ [n(u)]}. A representation A′ ofM′ can be obtained
from A by putting n(u) copies of the column representing u into A′ for each u ∈ U . For each i ∈ [n], let X ′i ⊆ U ′ be obtained
by replacing each element u in Xi with uj if Xi is the j-th set inX containing u. Clearly, by letting X ′i be a block (having size
b) for each i ∈ [n], we get a partition of U ′.
The sets {Xij | j ∈ [k]} satisfy the requirements (being disjoint and having an independent union inM) if and only if
the sets {X ′ij | j ∈ [k]} are k blocks whose union is independent inM′, and thus the algorithm of Theorem 3 provides the
solution. 
Lemma 5 ([24]). (1) Given a representation A over a field F of a matroidM, a representation of the dual matroidM∗ over F can
be found in polynomial time.
(2) Given a representation A over N of a matroidM and an integer k, a representation of the k-truncation of Mk can be found in
randomized polynomial time.
(3) Given a bipartite graph G(A, B; E), a representation of its transversal matroid over N can be constructed in randomized
polynomial time.
Now, we are ready to prove Lemma 2.
Proof (of Lemma 2). Let (S, C,H, f , A) be the given cma with f ≡ 1 for which we have to find an assignment covering at
least n singles and each resident that is a member of some couple in C . Clearly, we can assume A(c) ⊆ H × H .
Let G(H, S; E) be the bipartite graph where a single s ∈ S is connected with a hospital h ∈ H if and only if h ∈ A(s). We
can assume w.l.o.g. that G has a matching of size at least n as otherwise no solution may exist, and this case can be detected
easily in polynomial time. We define M(H, I) to be the matroid where a set X ⊆ H is independent if and only if there
is a matching in G that covers at least n singles but covers no hospitals from X . Observe thatM is exactly the dual of the
n-truncation of the transversal matroid of G, and thus it is indeed amatroid. By Lemma 5, we can find a linear representation
A ofM in randomized polynomial time.
We define the matroid M′(U, I′) with ground set U = H ∪ C such that X ⊆ U is independent in M′ if X ∩ H is
independent inM. A representation ofM′ can be obtained by appending a unit matrix of size k× k to A in the intersection
of k newly introduced rows and columns, each containing only zeros in the remaining entries. LetX be the collection of the
sets that are of the form {c, h1, h2}where c ∈ C and (h1, h2) ∈ A(c).
Observe that if X1, X2, . . . , Xk are k disjoint sets in X whose union is independent in M′, then we can construct an
assignment covering each resident that is a member of some couple and at least n additional singles as follows. For each
{c, h1, h2} ∈ {X1, . . . , Xk}we chooseM(c) from {(h1, h2), (h2, h1)} ∩ A(c) arbitrarily. The disjointness of the sets X1, . . . , Xk
30 D. Marx, I. Schlotter / Discrete Optimization 8 (2011) 25–40
guarantees that this way we assign exactly one resident to each hospital in X = i∈[k] Xi ∩ H . Now, let N be a matching
in G that covers at least n singles, but no hospitals from X . Such a matching exists, as X is independent inM. Thus, letting
M(s) be N(s) if s is covered by N and⊘ otherwise for each s ∈ S yields thatM is an assignment with the desired properties.
Conversely, ifM is an assignment covering each member of the couples and n additional singles, then the sets {c, h1, h2} for
each c ∈ C andM(c) = (h1, h2) form a collection of k disjoint sets inX whose union is independent inM′. By Corollary 4,
such a collection can be found in randomized FPT time when k is the parameter, yielding a solution if it exists. 
Using Lemma 2, we can prove Theorem 1.
Proof. Let I = (S, C,H, f , A) be the given cma in the Maximum Matching with Couples problem. We give an algorithm
that decides whether there is an assignment covering t residents in this instance.
First, we reduce the general problem to the 1-uniform case by ‘‘cloning’’ the hospitals. To this end, substitute each h ∈ H
with newly introduced hospitals h1, . . . , hf (h); the set of acceptable residents will be A(h) for each of these hospitals. Now,
for each single s and for each hospital h acceptable for s, replace h with the elements h1, . . . , hf (h) in the set of acceptable
hospitals for s. Also, for each couple c and for each entry (ha, hb) in A(c), replace the entry (ha, hb) in the set of of acceptable
hospital pairs for c with the elements in {(hia, hjb) | i ∈ [f (ha)], j ∈ [f (hb)]}. (The cases where ha = ⊘ or hb = ⊘ can be
handled similarly.)
It is easy to see that an assignment for I covering a certain set of residents can be transformed into an assignment for
the modified instance covering exactly the same residents, and vice versa. Note that this modification increases the input
length of the instance by at most a factor of f 2max, where fmax is the maximum capacity of some hospital in H . Since we can
assume fmax ≤ |S| + 2|C |without losing generality, this means that the input increases only by a polynomial factor.
Next, we show how to solve the 1-uniformMaximumMatchingwith Couples problem using the algorithm of Lemma 2.
For each couple c ∈ C , we branch into three cases, according to the cases where want to cover 0, 1, or 2 of the residents of
the couple c. In the branch where we do not want to cover any member of c , we simply delete c from the market. In the
branch where we only want to cover one member of the couple c , we can replace c with a new single sc that finds exactly
those hospitals h acceptable for which either (⊘, h) or (h,⊘) was acceptable for c. (We also have to replace the members
of c with sc in the acceptance lists of the hospitals.) After branching for each couple in C , we look for an assignment that
covers each resident in the remaining set C ′ of couples, and also t − 2|C ′| additional singles. This task can be accomplished
by using the algorithm of Lemma 2. Notice that the branchings only increase the running time by a factor of 3|C |.
Clearly, such an assignment yields an assignment of size t in the original instance I . Conversely, if there is an assignment
of size t in I , then at least one branch will lead to such an assignment. 
We remark that the main obstacle to derandomize the algorithm of Theorem 1 is the fact that the proof of Theorem 3
makes use of the Zippel–Schwartz Lemma in some issues connected to matroid representations, and hence is inherently
randomized (see also [24]).
4.2. An application in scheduling
Lemma 2 can be generalized in a straightforward way to the case when there are groups having some fixed size p ∈ N
instead of couples of size 2 in the given market. Then, in the proof of Lemma 2 we have to use blocks of size p+ 1 instead of
size 3, and hence we need to apply Corollary 4 with setting b = p+ 1. The running time of this more general version of the
algorithm is randomized FPT, if we regard both the number of groups and p as parameters. This has a useful consequence in
connection to the following scheduling problem.
We are given a setM of parallel machines and a set J of independent jobs. With each job j ∈ J we associate a processing
time pj and a processing set Mj ⊆ M of machines that can process j. The task is to find a scheduling where each job j is
(entirely) processed by a machine inMj. Formally, a scheduling in this setting is an assignment µ : J → M mapping each
job j ∈ J to some machine in its processing setMj. The makespan of a scheduling µ is the value maxm∈M∑µ(j)=m pj, which
describes the latest completion time when some machine inM finishes all the jobs assigned to it.
We consider the following problem in this context: given the set of jobs with their processing times and processing sets,
find a scheduling that minimizes the makespan. In the standard three-field notation of the area of scheduling algorithms,
this problem is abbreviated as P|Mj|Cmax.
Similar scheduling problems have been widely studied by researchers, see the recent survey of Leung and Li [29]. Due to
the computational hardness of these problems,most of thework in this area focuses on either approximation or exponential-
time algorithms. Also, researchers have extensively studied special cases which are more likely to be tractable, such as
scheduling with unit length jobs, or cases where the job processing restrictions exhibit some specific structure.
Here we complement this line of research by providing a randomized fixed-parameter tractable algorithm for the special
case of the P|Mj|Cmax problem where k jobs have processing time p ∈ N and all other jobs have processing time 1, and
we regard k as a parameter. This problem was proved to be NP-complete even if p = 2 (see [27,28]), so investigating the
parameterized complexity of this problem might be of practical importance.
Theorem 6. There is a randomized FPT algorithm for the special case of the P|Mj|Cmax problem where k jobs have processing
time p ∈ N and all other jobs have processing time 1, and we regard k and p as the parameter.
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Proof. Let us be given some instance I of the P|Mj|Cmax problemwhere k jobs have processing time p ∈ N and all other jobs
have processing time 1. Let J andM denote the set of jobs and machines, and let pj andMj denote the processing time and
the processing set for some job j ∈ J , respectively.
To construct a minimum makespan scheduling, we will use the generalized version of the algorithm presented in
Lemma 2, dealing with case when there are groups of some fixed size p instead of couples having size 2 in the market.
This algorithm runs in randomized FPT time, if both k and p are parameters.
We provide an algorithm that for any T ∈ N can construct a scheduling for the given instance I withmakespan at most T ,
if such a scheduling exists. By applying a binary search on the value of T we can extend this to finding aminimummakespan
scheduling. For a given value T ∈ N, we construct a 1-uniform cma as follows. Let z = ⌊T/p⌋. For each machine m ∈ M
we define T hospitals h1m, h
2
m, . . . , h
T
m (each with capacity 1). For each job jwith processing time 1, we add a corresponding
single resident sj that finds exactly the hospitals in {him | m ∈Mj, i ∈ [T ]} acceptable. For each job jwith processing time p,
we add a corresponding group gj consisting of p newly introduced residents, and we let the acceptable p-tuple of hospitals
for gj be {(h(i−1)p+1m , h(i−1)p+2m , . . . , hipm) | m ∈Mj, i ∈ [z]}. We apply the generalized version of the algorithm of Lemma 2 to
find an assignment covering each resident in this instance.
Note that the number of groups is k (the number of jobs with processing time p) and the number of singles is |J| − k (the
number of remaining jobs). It is also easy to see that the construction time is polynomial in T and the original input length,
observe that T ≤ p|J| can also be assumed. Thus, the presented algorithm runs in randomized FPT time with parameters k
and p.
It remains to show the correctness of the algorithm. First we prove that any assignment covering each resident can be
used to construct a scheduling µ for I with makespan at most T as follows. If some single sj is assigned to some hospital
in him, then we let µ(j) = m; note that µ(j) ∈ Mj holds. Similarly, for each group gj assigned to a p-tuple of hospitals
(h(i−1)p+1m , . . . , hipm) for somem ∈ Mj and i ∈ [z], we let µ(j) = m. Clearly, this is a scheduling for I with makespan at most
T .
For the other direction, suppose thatµ is a schedulingwithmakespan T . Let Jm be the set of jobs assigned to somemachine
m, and suppose that Jm contains the jobs jx1 , . . . , jxa with processing time p, and the jobs jy1 , . . . , jyb with processing time
1. In this case, we assign each group gxi to the p-tuple of hospitals (h
(i−1)p+1
m , . . . , h
ip
m), and we assign each single syi to
the hospital hpa+im . It is easy to verify that this way we indeed obtain an assignment in the constructed cma covering each
resident. 
4.3. Local search
Here, we investigate the applicability of the local search approach to handle the intractability of theMaximumMatching
with Couples problem.
Theorem 7. There is no permissive local search algorithm for the 2-uniform Maximum Matching with Couples that runs in
FPT time with parameter ℓ denoting the radius of the explored neighborhood, unlessW[1] = FPT.
Proof. Let G be the input graph for the Clique problem and k be the parameter given. We denote the vertices of G by
v1, v2, . . . , vn. We claim that if there is a permissive local search algorithm A for Maximum Matching with Couples
running in FPT time with parameter ℓ, then we can useA to solve Clique in FPT time. To prove this, we construct an input
Λ = (I,M0, ℓ) of A with the following properties: every assignment for I with size at least |M0| + 1 is ℓ-close to M0, and
there is such an assignment for I if and only if G has a clique of size k. Thus, G has a clique of size k if and only ifA outputs
an assignment for I with size at least |M0| + 1.
To construct Λ, we first define the cma I together with the assignment M0 for it. Let the set H of hospitals be the union
of D = B ∪ {H i,j | i, j ∈ [k]}, D′ = B′ ∪ {H ′i,j | i, j ∈ [k]} and F = {fi | i ∈ [k]}, where B = {bi | i ∈ [2k − 1]},
H i,i = {hi,ij,j | j ∈ [n]} for each i ∈ [k], H i,j = {hi,jx,y | vxvy ∈ E(G)} for each i ≠ j, {i, j} ⊆ [k], and for each hospital
h in B (H i,j, respectively) we also define a hospital h′ to be in B′ (H ′i,j, respectively). For brevity, we will use the notation
H i,jh,• = {h | ∃y : h = hi,jh,y ∈ H i,j} and H i,j•,h = {h | ∃x : h = hi,jx,h ∈ H i,j}. The capacity of each hospital is 2. For each hospital
h ∈ Dwe define a couple denoted by c(h), and for each h′ ∈ D′ we define two singles s1(h′) and s2(h′). Let C = {c(h) | h ∈ D}
and let S = {s0} ∪ {si(h′) | h′ ∈ D′, i ∈ {1, 2}}.
Before defining A(p) for each p ∈ S ∪ C , we define the assignment M0 for I , as this will not cause any confusion. Let
M0(s0) = ⊘, and letM0(p) = h where either h ∈ D and p is a member of the couple c(h), or h ∈ D′ and p ∈ {s1(h), s2(h)}.
Now, for each p ∈ S∪C , we define the set of acceptable hospitals or pairs of hospitals A(p) to be the union of {M0(p)} and the
set A′(p) of hospitals, defined below, that can be assigned to p besidesM0(p). We define A′(p) for each p ∈ S ∪ C as follows.
A′(c(h)) = {(h′, h′)} for each h ∈ D
A′(s0) = {b1}
A′(s1(b′i)) = H1,i for each i ∈ [k]
A′(s2(b′i)) = {bi+1} for each i ∈ [k]
A′(s1(b′k+i)) = H i,1 for each i ∈ [k− 1]
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Fig. 1. A block diagram showing the hospitals in the proof of Theorem 7. For two sets H1,H2 of hospitals, (H1,H2) is an arc if A′(s) ⊆ H2 for some s ∈ S
withM0(s) ∈ H1 .
A′(s2(b′k+i)) = {bk+i+1} for each i ∈ [k− 2]
A′(s2(b′2k−1)) = Hk,1
A′(s1(h′i,jx,y)) = H i,j+1x,• for each i ∈ [k], j ∈ [k− 1] and every possible x and y
A′(s1(h′i,kx,y )) = {fi} for each i ∈ [k] and every possible x and y
A′(s2(h′i,jx,y)) = H i+1,j•,y for each i ∈ [k− 1], j ∈ [k] and every possible x and y
A′(s2(h′k,ix,y )) = {fi} for each i ∈ [k] and every possible x and y.
This completes the definition of the cma I = (S, C,H, f , A). Observe that M0 indeed is an assignment for I . Finally, setting
ℓ = 4k2 + 8k− 3 finishes the definition of the instanceΛ = (I,M0, ℓ). Fig. 1 shows an illustration.
First, suppose thatM is an assignment for I such that |M| > |M0|.We do not requireM to be (4k2+8k−3)-close toM0, but
wewill actually prove that this is necessary. Observe thatM0 covers each resident except for s0, soM must cover all residents
to satisfy |M| > |M0|. As A(s0) = {b1},M must assign b1 to s0. This impliesM(c(b1)) = (b′1, b′1), and therefore we also have
M(s2(b′1)) = b2, implying M(c(b2)) = (b′2, b′2), and so on. Following this argument, it can be seen that M(c(bi)) = (b′i, b′i)
for every i ∈ [2k− 1], andM(s2(b′i)) = bi+1 for every i ∈ [2k− 2].
We say that a single s enters H i,j ifM(s) ∈ H i,j butM0(s) ∉ H i,j, and leaves H ′i,j ifM0(s) ∈ H ′i,j butM(s) ∉ H ′i,j. A couple
c moves from a hospital h if M0(c) = (h, h) ≠ M(c), and we say that c moves from a set J ⊆ H of hospitals if it moves
from a hospital in J . Observe that if c moves from H i,j, then two singles leave H ′i,j, one of them entering H i+1,j if i ≠ k, and
the other entering H i,j+1 if j ≠ k. If a single s leaves H ′i,j but does not enter H i+1,j or H i,j+1, then M(s) ∈ F must hold, and
therefore there can exist at most 2k such single s. Moreover, if a set ofm singles enter H i,j then at least ⌈m/2⌉ couples have
to move from H i,j. For each i ∈ [k], exactly one single from {s1(b′1), s1(b′2), . . . , s1(b′k)} enters H1,i, and exactly one single
from {s1(b′k+1), s1(b′k+2), . . . , s1(b′2k−1), s2(b′2k−1)} enters H i,1. These altogether imply that exactly one couple moves from
H i,j for each i, j ∈ [k], and that if s and s′ enter H i,j thenM(s) = M(s′)must hold.
Suppose that c moves from the hospital hi,jx,y. Observe that if j < k then a couple must move from H
i,j+1
x,• , and similarly, if
i < k then a couplemustmove fromH i+1,j•,y . For each i ∈ [k], letting σh(i) be x if for some j a couplemoves fromH i,jx,•, and σv(i)
be y if for some j a couple moves from H j,i•,y, we obtain that σh(i) and σv(i) are well-defined. Observe that by the definition
of H i,i we get σh(i) = σv(i) := σ(i), and from the definition of H i,j we get that if σ(i) = x and σ(j) = y for some i ≠ j, then
vxvy must be an edge in G. Thus, the set {vσ(i) | i ∈ [k]} forms a clique of size k in G.
Remember that exactly one couple moves from H i,j for each i, j ∈ [k], which (considering also the size of F ) forces
exactly two singles to leave H ′i,j for each i, j ∈ [k]. Taking into account the couples c(bi) and the singles s1(b′i), s2(b′i) for
each i ∈ [2k− 1] and the single s0, we get thatM is 4k2 + 4(2k− 1)+ 1 = (4k2 + 8k− 3) = ℓ-close toM0.
Now, suppose vσ(1), vσ(2), . . . , vσ(k) form a clique in G. By defining M as below, it is straightforward to verify that M is
an assignment for (S, C,H, f , A)which covers every resident, and is ℓ-close toM0.
M(c(bi)) = (b′i, b′i) for each i ∈ [2k− 1]
M(c(hi,jσ(i),σ (j))) = (h′i,jσ(i),σ (j), h′i,jσ(i),σ (j)) for each i, j ∈ [k]
M(s0) = b1
M(s1(b′i)) = h1,iσ(1),σ (i) for each i ∈ [k]
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M(s1(b′k+i)) = hi,1σ(i),σ (1) for each i ∈ [k− 1]
M(s2(b′2k−1)) = hk,1σ(k),σ (1)
M(s2(b′i)) = bi+1 for each i ∈ [2k− 2]
M(s1(h
′i,j
σ(i),σ (j))) = hi,j+1σ(i),σ (j+1) for each i ∈ [k], j ∈ [k− 1]
M(s2(h
′i,j
σ(i),σ (j))) = hi+1,jσ(i+1),σ (j) for each i ∈ [k− 1], j ∈ [k]
M(s1(h
′i,k
σ(i),σ (k))) = fi for each i ∈ [k]
M(s2(h
′k,i
σ(k),σ (i))) = fi for each i ∈ [k]
M(p) = M0(p) for every p ∈ S ∪ C whereM(p)was not defined above. 
Let us now remark that the proof of Theorem 7 implicitly contains an FPT reduction from Clique to the decision version
of the local search problem for the 2-uniform Maximum Matching with Couples. However, as discussed in Section 2, the
presented result is stronger than aW [1]-hardness proof.
5. Matching with preferences
In this section, we study the Hospitals/Residents with Couples problem in detail. If no couples are involved, then a
stable assignment for a given couples’ market with preferences can always be found in linear time with the Gale–Shapley
algorithm [1]. In the case when couples are present, a stable assignment may not exist, as first proved by Roth [2]. Here we
also give a simple example.
Let H = {h1, h2, h3}, S = ∅, C = {(a, b), (c, d)} and f ≡ 1. The preference lists are defined below. It is straightforward
to verify that no stable assignment exists for this cmp which will be denoted by I0. For example,M(a) = h1,M(b) = h2 and
M(c) = M(d) = ⊘ is not stable, because (c, d) and (h1, h3) form a blocking pair.
L((a, b)) : (h1, h2), (h2, h3), (h3, h1) L(h1) = L(h2) = L(h3) : c, a, b, d
L((c, d)) : (h1, h3), (h2, h1), (h3, h2).
Ronn proved that deciding whether a stable assignment exists for a cmp is NP-complete [13]. As the following example
shows, an instance of the Hospitals/Residents with Couples problemmay admit stable assignments of different sizes. The
example contains a single s, a couple c = (c1, c2) and hospitals h1 and h2 with capacities f (h1) = 2 and f (h2) = 1. The
preference lists are the following:
L(s) : h2, h1 L(h1) : s, c1, c2
L(c) : (h1, h1), (⊘, h2) L(h2) : c2, s.
In this instance, assigning s to h1 and c to (⊘, h2) yields a stable assignment of size 2, whilst assigning s to h2 and c to (h1, h1)
results in a stable assignment of size 3. Note thatMaximumHospitals/Residentswith Couples problem,where the task is to
determine a stable assignment of maximum size for a given cmp, is trivially NP-hard, as it contains theHospitals/Residents
with Couples problem.
The parameterized complexity ofHospitals/Residents with Couples is covered in Section 5.1. In Section 5.2, we present
results concerning the applicability of local search for theMaximum Hospitals/Residents with Couples problem.
5.1. Fixed-parameter tractability
The main result of this subsection is Theorem 8, which shows the W [1]-hardness of the Hospitals/Residents with
Couples problem with parameter |C |. As a consequence, the optimization problem Maximum Hospitals/Residents with
Couples is alsoW [1]-hard with parameter |C |.
However, supposing that a stable assignment has already beendetermined by somemethod, it is a valid questionwhether
we can increase its size. Given a cmp I and a stable assignment M0 for I , the Increase Hospitals/Residents with Couples
problem asks for a stable assignment with size at least |M0| + 1. If no couples are involved, then all stable assignments
for the instance have the same size, so this problem is trivially polynomial-time solvable. Theorem 8 shows that Increase
Hospitals/Residents with Couples is alsoW [1]-hard with parameter |C |.
Theorem 8. (1) The decision version of Hospitals/Residents with Couples is W [1]-hard with parameter |C |, even in the
1-uniform case.
(2) The decision version of IncreaseHospitals/Residentswith Couples isW[1]-hardwith parameter |C |, even in the 1-uniform
case.
Before proving Theorem 8, we introduce a special construction that will be very useful in the proof. For a graph G and an
integer k, we construct a cmp IG,k = (S, C,H, f , L) as follows. See Fig. 2 for an illustration.
Let V (G) = {vi | i ∈ [n]}, |E(G)| = m and let ν be a bijection from [m] into the set {(x, y) | vxvy ∈ E(G), x < y}. First, we
construct a node gadget Gi for each i ∈ [k] and an edge gadget Gi,j for each pair (i, j) ∈

[k]
2

. The node gadget Gi contains
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Fig. 2. A node gadget and an edge gadget of IG,k . Hospitals are represented by rectangles, singles by black circles, andmembers of couples by double circles.
A hospital h is connected to some resident r if r ∈ AL(h). The numbers on the edges represent ranks, bold edges represent MG,k0 from Lemma 9, and dix is
for |Q ix| + 2.
hospitals H i ∪ Gi ∪ {f i}, singles S i ∪ T i and a couple ai. Analogously, the edge gadget Gi,j contains hospitals H i,j ∪ Gi,j ∪ {f i,j},
singles S i,j ∪ T i,j and a couple ai,j. Here T i = {t ij | j ∈ [n − 1]} and T i,j = {t i,je | e ∈ [m − 1]}, H i = {hij | j ∈ [n]} and
H i,j = {hi,je | e ∈ [m]}, and we define Gi, S i and Gi,j, S i,j similarly to H i and H i,j. Observe that |C | = k+

k
2

.
We let f ≡ 1, so IG,k is 1-uniform. The precedence lists for each agent in IG,k are defined below. The notation [X] for some
set X in a preference list denotes an arbitrary ordering of the elements of X . We write Q ix for the set {si,je | i < j ≤ k, ∃y :
ν(e) = (x, y)} ∪ {sj,ie | 1 ≤ j < i, ∃y : ν(e) = (y, x)} and Q i,je for {hix, hjy}where ν(e) = (x, y). The indices in the precedence
lists take all possible values if not stated otherwise, and the symbol α can be any index in [k] or a pair of indices in

[k]
2

. If
α takes a value in [k] then N(α) = n, otherwise N(α) = m. (This notation will be used again later on.)
L(gαx ) : tαx−1, aα(2), tαx if 1 < x < N(α) L(hix) : ai(1), [Q ix], six
L(gα1 ) : aα(2), tα1 L(hi,je ) : ai,j(1), si,je
L(gαN(α)) : tαN(α)−1, aα(2), aα(1) L(six) : hix, f i
L(tαx ) : gαx , gαx+1 L(si,je ) : hi,je , [Q i,je ], f i,j
L(f α) : sα1 , sα2 , . . . , sαN(α), aα(2)
L(aα) : (gαN(α), f α), (hα1 , gαN(α)), (hα2 , gαN(α)−1), . . . , (hαN(α), gα1 ).
Lemma 9. For a graph G and k ∈ N, IG,k has a stable assignment MG,k0 that covers each resident. Moreover, statements (1)–(3) are
equivalent:
(1) There is a clique in G of size k.
(2) There is a stable assignment M for IG,k with the following property, which we will call property π : M(f i,j) ⊆ S i,j for each
(i, j) ∈

[k]
2

.
(3) There is a stable assignment for IG,k with property π covering each resident.
Proof. To see the first claim, we define an assignment M0 by letting M0(aα) = (gαN(α), f α), M0(tαx ) = gαx , and M0(sαx ) = hαx
for all possible values of α and x. As each single and couple is assigned to his or their best choice, M0 is stable and covers
each resident.
To prove (2)⇒ (1), suppose that IG,k has a stable assignmentM with propertyπ . Let us define σ(i, j) for each (i, j) ∈

[k]
2

such thatM(f i,j) = {si,jσ(i,j)}. Since si,jσ(i,j) prefers hi,jσ(i,j) to f i,j,M(hi,jσ(i,j)) = {ai,j(1)} follows from the stability ofM . From this, we
get thatM(si,je ) = hi,je must hold for each e ∈ [m] \ {σ(i, j)} since otherwise si,je and hi,je would form a blocking pair. Note that
each single in S i,j is assigned to a hospital in H i,j ∪ {f i,j}. As this holds for each (i, j) ∈

[k]
2

, we get thatM(hix) ⊆ S i ∪ {ai(1)}
holds for each i ∈ [k], x ∈ [n].
Let ν(σ (i, j)) = (x, y) for some (i, j) ∈

[k]
2

. Since si,jσ(i,j) prefers the hospitals in Q
i,j
σ(i,j) = {hix, hjy} to f i,j, M can only
be stable if both hix and h
j
y prefer their partner in M to s
i,j
σ(i,j). This implies M(h
i
x) = {ai(1)} and M(hjy) = {aj(1)}. Thus, by
defining σ(i) to be x if M(ai) = (hix, g in+1−x) for each i ∈ [k], we obtain ν(σ (i, j)) = (σ (i), σ (j)). From the definition of ν,
this implies that vσ(i) and vσ(j) are adjacent in G. As this holds for every (i, j) ∈

[k]
2

, we get that {vσ(i) | i ∈ [k]} is a clique
in G.
Nowwe prove (1)⇒ (3). If vσ(1), vσ(2), . . . , vσ(k) form a clique inG, then define σ(i, j) such that σ(i, j) = ν−1(σ (i), σ (j)).
We define a stable assignmentM fulfilling property π and covering every resident as follows.
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Fig. 3. The path gadget P in I2 . Bold edges representM2 .
M(sασ(α)) = f α
M(sαx ) = hαx if x ∈ [N(α)] \ {σ(α)}
M(aα) = (hασ(α), g iN(α)+1−σ(α))
M(tαx ) = gαx if 1 ≤ x < N(α)+ 1− σ(α)
M(tαx ) = gαx+1 if N(α)+ 1− σ(α) ≤ x < N(α).
It is not hard to verify the stability ofM by simply checking all possibilities to find a blocking pair. (We note that many of the
agents are only contained in IG,k to assure that a clique inG indeed implies a stable assignmentwith the required properties.)
As (3)⇒ (2) is trivial, this finishes the proof. 
Proof (of Theorem 8). Let G be an arbitrary graph and k ∈ N. We construct two 1-uniform cmps I1 and I2, together with a
stable assignmentM2 for I2 such that the following three statements are equivalent:
(a) G has a clique of size k,
(b) I1 has a stable assignment,
(c) I2 has a stable assignment of size greater than |M2|.
Furthermore, the construction will take FPT time, and there will be k+ 3

k
2

couples in I1, and k+

k
2

+ 1 couples in I2.
Thus, (a) ⇐⇒ (b) yields an FPT reduction from Clique to Hospitals/Residents with Couples, and (a) ⇐⇒ (c) yields an
FPT reduction from Clique to Increase Hospitals/Residents with Couples.
To get I1, we simply combine the cmp I0 having no stable assignment with the cmp IG,k. This is done by introducing new
couples bi,j and c i,j, and new hospitals f¯ i,j1 and f¯
i,j
2 for each (i, j) ∈

[k]
2

, and adding these agents to IG,k. We preserve the
preference lists of IG,k, except for hospitals

f i,j | (i, j) ∈

[k]
2

, and we give the missing preference lists below.
L(bi,j) : (f i,j, f¯ i,j1 ), (f¯ i,j1 , f¯ i,j2 ), (f¯ i,j2 , f i,j)
L(c i,j) : (f i,j, f¯ i,j2 ), (f¯ i,j1 , f i,j), (f¯ i,j2 , f¯ i,j1 )
L(f¯ i,j1 ) = L(f¯ i,j2 ) : c i,j(1), bi,j(1), bi,j(2), c i,j(2)
L(f i,j) : si,j1 , si,j2 , . . . , si,jm , c i,j(1), bi,j(1), bi,j(2), c i,j(2).
Observe that if we restrict I1 to contain only the hospitals f i,j, f¯
i,j
1 and f¯
i,j
2 and the couples b
i,j and c i,j for some (i, j) ∈

[k]
2

,
we obtain a cmp isomorphic to I0, having no stable assignment. Therefore, any stable assignmentM must assign a single in
S i,j to f i,j, for each (i, j) ∈

[k]
2

. The restriction of such anM on the agents of IG,k must also be stable, because agents of IG,k
cannot be assigned byM to agents outside IG,k. Thus, by Lemma 9, G has a k-clique.
For the other direction, if there is a k-clique in G, then we can construct a stable assignment M ′1 for I1 by setting
M ′1(bi,j) = (f¯ i,j1 , f¯ i,j2 ),M ′1(c i,j) = (⊘,⊘) for each (i, j) ∈

[k]
2

, andM ′1(r) = MG,kπ (r) for the residents in IG,k, whereMπ (G, k)
is the stable assignment for IG,k with property π , guaranteed by Lemma 9. It is easy to see that M ′1 is stable, by using the
stability ofMπ (G, k). This finishes the proof of the first claim.
To construct I2, we add a path gadget P to IG,k that contains the newly introduced hospitals

pi | i ∈ [

k
2

+ 2]

, singles
qi | i ∈

k
2

and a couple b. See Fig. 3 for an illustration. As before, we only modify the preferences of the hospitals
f i,j | (i, j) ∈

[k]
2

, and we give the missing preference lists below. The notation ρ used there denotes a bijection from
k
2

into

[k]
2

.
L(p1) : b(1), q1 L(pi) : qi−1, qi if 1 < i ≤

k
2

L(p k
2

+1) : q k2 , b(2) L(p k2 +2) : b(2)
L(qi) : pi, f ρ(i), pi+1 L(f i,j) : si,j1 , si,j2 , . . . , si,jm , qρ−1(i,j), ai,j(2)
L(b) : (⊘, p k
2

+1), (p1, p

k
2

+2).
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Fig. 4. The modified node gadget in the proof of Theorem 10. Bold edges representM3 .
We also letM2(qi) = pi for each i ∈

k
2

,M2(b) = (⊘, p k
2

+1), andM2(r) = MG,k0 (r) for the residents in IG,k, where
MG,k0 is the stable assignment for I
G,k, provided by Lemma 9. Note thatM2 is indeed stable.
Suppose, there is a stable assignmentM for I2 with |M| > |M2|. Observe thatM2 covers each resident except for b(1), so
M must cover every resident, implying M(b) = (p1, p k
2

+2). Also, since M(h) cannot be empty for any hospital h, we get
M(pi) = {qi−1} for each i =

k
2

+ 1,

k
2

, . . . , 2. Therefore, f ρ(i) is beneficial for qi for each i ∈

k
2

, so by the stability
of M we obtain M(f i,j) ⊆ S i,j for each (i, j) ∈

[k]
2

. Again, the restriction of M on the agents of IG,k must be stable, and so
Lemma 9 implies that G has a clique of size k.
Conversely, if there is a k-clique in G, then we can define a stable assignmentM ′2 for I2, covering each resident, as follows.
We let M ′2(qi) = pi+1 for each i ∈

k
2

, M ′2(b) = (p1, p k
2

+2), and M
′
2(r) = MG,kπ (r) for the residents in IG,k. Again M ′2 is
stable, and has size greater than |M2|, proving the second claim. 
5.2. Local search
Here we investigate the applicability of the local search approach for theMaximum Hospitals/Residents with Couples
problem. Theorem 10 shows that no permissive local search algorithm is likely to exist for this problem running in FPT time
with parameter ℓ, denoting the radius of the explored neighborhood. However, if we regard the combined parameterization
(ℓ, |C |), then even a strict local search algorithm with FPT running time can be given, as presented in Theorem 11.
Theorem 10. There is no permissive local search algorithm for the 1-uniform Maximum Hospitals/Residents with Couples
that runs in FPT time with parameter ℓ, unlessW[1] = FPT.
Proof. Let G be a graph and k an integer. First, recall the cmp I2 defined in the proof of Theorem 8, and observe that the
assignment M2 and the assignment M ′2, constructed when a k-clique is present in G, may not be close to each other. Thus,
in order to present an FPT-reduction here, we need to modify the node and edge gadgets of I2. We are going to construct a
cmp I3 together with a stable assignmentM3 for it such that the following statements are equivalent:
(a) G has a clique of size k.
(b) There is a stable assignment for I3 with size at least |M3| + 1.
(c) There is a stable assignment for I3 with size at least |M3| + 1 that is ℓ-close toM3 where ℓ = 8

k
2

+ 7k+ 2.
The construction will take FPT time, hence a permissive local search algorithm for Maximum Hospitals/Residents with
Couples that runs in FPT time with parameter ℓ can be used to solve Clique in FPT time.
See Fig. 4 for an illustration of the modifications applied to the instance I2 in order to get I3. For each node gadget and
edge gadgetGα , we take new singles {uαx | x ∈ [N(α)]} and the single tαN(α), new couples {cαx | x ∈ [N(α)]}, and newhospitals
x∈[N(α)]{g¯αx , eαx , e¯αx } ∪ {f¯ α}. For most of the agents we preserve the preferences originally defined for I2. The modifications
and the preference lists of the newly defined agents are as follows.
L(gαx ) : cαx (1), aα(2) L(tαx ) : g¯αx , f¯ α
L(eαx ) : uαx , cαx (1) L(uαx ) : e¯αx , eαx
L(e¯αx ) : cαx (2), uαx L(cαx ) = (eαx , g¯αx ), (gαx , e¯αx )
L(g¯αx ) : cαx (2), tαx L(f¯ α) : tα1 , tα2 , . . . , tαN(α), aα(1)
L(aα) : (f¯ α, f α), (hα1 , gαN(α)), (hα2 , gαN(α)−1), . . . , (hαN(α), gα1 ).
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Fig. 5. A possible component of Gδ . Winners and losers are marked by ‘+’ and ‘−’ signs, respectively. Bold edges representM0 , normal edges representM .
We also define M3(aα) = (f¯ α, f α), M3(cαx ) = (gαx , e¯αx ), M3(uαx ) = eαx and M3(tαx ) = g¯αx for all possible values of α and x,
and for each remaining resident r letM3(r) = M2(r). It is easy to observe thatM3 is stable, and covers each resident except
for b(1).
Supposing that there is a stable assignmentM with size greater than |M3| and using exactly the same arguments as in the
proof of Theorem 8, we getM(b) = (p1, p k
2

+2),M(qi) = (pi+1) for each i ∈

k
2

, andM(f i,j) ⊆ S i,j for each (i, j) ∈

[k]
2

.
By following the argument proving (2)⇒ (1) in Lemma 9, we again obtain that Gmust have a k-clique. (The modifications
of the gadgets in I3 to do not affect that reasoning.) This proves (b)⇒ (a).
Clearly, (c)⇒ (b) is trivial, so we only have to prove (a)⇒ (c). Suppose that G has a clique {vσ(i) | i ∈ [k]}. We again let
σ(i, j) = ν−1(σ (i), σ (j)), and we write σ ′(α) for N(α)+ 1− σ(α). We define a stable assignmentM ′3 for I in a very similar
fashion as in the previous proofs:
M ′3(b) = (p1, p k
2

+2) M
′
3(u
α
σ ′(α)) = e¯ασ ′(α)
M ′3(qi) = pi+1 for each i ∈
[
k
2
]
M ′3(s
α
σ(α)) = f α
M ′3(a
α) = (hασ(α), gασ ′(α)) M ′3(tασ ′(α)) = f¯ α
M ′3(c
α
σ ′(α)) = (eασ ′(α), g¯ασ ′(α)).
For each remaining resident r we let M ′3(r) = M3(r). It is straightforward to verify that M ′3 is stable, and it is ℓ-close
toM0. 
Before stating our last result, we describe the trick of cloning hospitals, already mentioned in Section 4, for the case
involving preferences. For each hospital h ∈ H in a given cmp, we take f (h) copies of h by replacing h with new hospitals
h1, . . . , hf (h), each having capacity 1. The preference lists of these hospitals agree with the original preference list of h. For
each single s containing h in its preference list, we replace h in the list L(s) by the series h1, . . . , hf (h). For a couple c containing
a pair (h, g) of two hospitals in L(c), we replace (h, g) by a series formed by the elements of {(hi, g j) : i ∈ [f (h)], j ∈ [f (g)]}
such that (hi, g j) precedes (hi
′
, g j
′
) if i < i′, or i = i′ and j < j′. (We assume that the cases h = ⊘ and g = ⊘ are also clear.)
Now, ifM is an assignment for the original cmp I , then it defines an assignmentMc for the cmp Ic obtained by the above
cloning process, as follows. IfM assigns r to h and there are i− 1 residents inM(h) that h prefers to r , then letMc(r) = hi.
If M(r) = ⊘ for some r , then we let Mc(r) = ⊘ as well. Observe that if M is stable then Mc is also stable. Conversely, it is
not hard to see that a stable assignment for Ic can be transformed in the straightforward way to a stable assignment for I .
Theorem 11. There is a strict local search algorithm for Maximum Hospitals/Residents with Couples running in FPT time
with combined parameter (ℓ, |C |).
Proof. Let I = (S, C,H, f , L) be given with the stable assignmentM0 and the integer ℓ. W.l.o.g. we may assume that f ≡ 1,
as otherwise we can apply the trick of cloning the hospitals, as argued above. Thus, ifM(r) = h for some resident r , then we
will writeM(h) = r instead ofM(h) = {r}.
Before describing the strict local search algorithm forMaximum Hospitals/Residents with Couples, we introduce some
notation to capture the structure of the solution. The bipartite graph G underlying I has vertex set H ∪ R and edge set
E = {hr | h ∈ H, r ∈ AL(h)}. Clearly, an assignmentM for I determines amatching E(M) inG in the naturalway: hr ∈ E(M) if
and only ifM(r) = h for some resident r and hospital h. Suppose thatM is a closest solution, i.e. a stable assignment for I with
|M| > |M0| and d(M,M0) ≤ ℓ that is the closest toM0 among all such assignments. Let Aδ = {a ∈ R ∪ H | M(a) ≠ M0(a)},
and Eδ be the symmetric difference of E(M0) and E(M). Note that Eδ covers exactly the vertices of Aδ , and Gδ = (Aδ, Eδ)
is the union of paths and cycles which contain edges from M0 and M in an alternating manner. It is well-known that for
a cmp not containing couples, every stable assignment covers exactly the same agents [30]. Thus, it is easy to see that the
stability ofM andM0 imply that if a component of Gδ does not contain any resident from R \ S, then it must be a cycle. Let
K0 denote the set of such cycles, andK1 the set of the remaining components of Gδ . We write Cδ for (R \ S) ∩ Aδ , and we
define B(a) = {b | a is beneficial for bw.r.t.M0} for every a ∈ S ∪ H . We also let S+ = {s ∈ S | M(s) is beneficial for sw.r.t.
M0}, and S− = {s ∈ S | M0(s) is beneficial for s w.r.t. M}. Note that S+ ∪ S− = S ∩ Aδ . We define H+ and H− analogously.
We call agents in A+ = S+ ∪ H+ winners and agents in A− = S− ∪ H− losers. For a simple illustration see Fig. 5.
Now, we describe an algorithm that finds vertices of Aδ . The algorithm first branches on guessing |Aδ| and a copy G¯
of the graph Gδ . Let ϕ denote an isomorphism from G¯ to Gδ . The algorithm also guesses the vertex sets ϕ−1(Cδ),
ϕ−1(H+), ϕ−1(H−), ϕ−1(S+), ϕ−1(S−), and edge sets E¯M0 and E¯M denoting ϕ
−1(E(M0) ∩ Eδ) and ϕ−1(E(M) ∩ Eδ), respec-
tively. Since |Aδ| ≤ 2ℓ, it can be achieved by careful implementation that the algorithm branches into at most (2ℓ)62ℓ
directions in this phase.
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Fig. 6. Figure (Ri) shows a subgraph of Gδ illustrating Extension Rule i, for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 6}. We represent agents of ϕ(X) by enclosing them in a rectangular
box. Bold edges represent E¯M0 and normal edges represent E¯M .
Next, we apply the technique of color-coding [31], in order to help the localization of Aδ . To this end, the algorithm colors
the vertices of G with |Aδ| ≤ 2ℓ colors randomly with uniform and independent distribution; γ (a) denotes the color of a.
The coloring γ is nice, if γ (ϕ(a)) = Γ (a) for each a ∈ V (G¯), where Γ is an arbitrary fixed ordering of V (G¯), i.e. a bijection
from V (G¯) to [|Aδ|]. From now on, we suppose that γ is nice, which clearly holds with probability |Aδ|−|Aδ | ≥ (2ℓ)−2ℓ.
Given a coloring, the algorithm grows a subset X ⊆ V (G¯) onwhich ϕ is already known. It applies the following extension
rules repeatedly, until none of them is applicable. When Extension Rule 1 is applied, the algorithm branches into at most
2|C | branches, but no other branchings are involved. We write X¯ = V (G¯) \ X . See Fig. 6 for an illustration.
Extension Rule 1 (Guessing a Member of a Couple). Applicable if c ∈ X¯ ∩ ϕ−1(Cδ). In this case we simply branch on the
vertices of (R \ S) ∩ {a | γ (a) = Γ (c)} to choose ϕ(c). Note that this means at most 2|C | branches.
Extension Rule 2 (Finding Pairs by M0). Applicable if x ∈ X, y ∈ X¯ and xy ∈ E¯M0 for some x and y. Clearly, we get
ϕ(y) = M0(ϕ(x)), so we can extend ϕ by adding y to X .
Extension Rule 3 (Finding Pairs byM for Losers). Applicable if x ∈ X∩ϕ−1(A−), y ∈ X¯∩ϕ−1(A+) and xy ∈ E¯M for some x and
y. Let y∗ be the first element in the preference list L(ϕ(x)) contained in the set B(ϕ(x))having colorΓ (y).We claim y∗ = ϕ(y).
Clearly,ϕ(y) ∈ B(ϕ(x))holds becauseϕ(y) is awinner, and its colormust beΓ (y) asγ is nice. Now, suppose for contradiction
that y∗ precedes ϕ(y) in L(ϕ(x)). Since the only vertex in Aδ having color Γ (y) is ϕ(y), we getM(y∗) = M0(y∗) implying that
y∗ and ϕ(x) form a blocking pair forM . Thus, ϕ(y) = y∗ can be found in linear time, so we can extend ϕ by adding y to X .
Extension Rule 4 (Finding Pairs byM for Couples with OneWinner Hospital). Applicable if c(i) ∈ Cδ∩ϕ(X), y ∈ ϕ−1(H+)∩ X¯ ,
ϕ−1(c(i))y ∈ E¯M , and M(c(i′)) is already known for some c ∈ C , i ≠ i′ and y. W.l.o.g. we assume i = 1. Let h be defined
such that (h,M(c(2))) is the first element in L(c) for which h ∈ B(c(1)) and h has color Γ (y). We claim ϕ(y) = h. Observe
that ϕ(y) ∈ B(c(1)) must hold because ϕ(y) is a winner. As γ is nice, ϕ(y) indeed has color Γ (y). Thus, if h ≠ ϕ(y) then
(h,M(c(2))) precedes (ϕ(y),M(c(2))) in L(c), but this implies that the couple c and (h,M(c(2))) form a blocking pair for
M . Therefore we get ϕ(y) = h, and we can extend ϕ in linear time by adding y to X .
Extension Rule 5 (Finding Pairs byM for Coupleswith TwoWinner Hospitals).Applicable if c(i) ∈ Cδ∩ϕ(X), yi ∈ ϕ−1(H+)∩X¯ ,
and ϕ−1(c(i))yi ∈ E¯M holds for both i ∈ {1, 2}, for some c ∈ C , y1 and y2. We let (h1, h2) be the first element in L(c) such
that hi ∈ B(c(i)) and γ (hi) = Γ (yi) for both i ∈ {1, 2}. Using the same arguments as in the previous case, we can argue that
ϕ(y1) = h1 and ϕ(y2) = h2 hold. Thus, in this case we can extend ϕ in linear time by adding both y1 and y2 to X .
Extension Rule 6 (Dissolving a Blocking Pair). Applicable if M(a) ∈ ϕ(X) if and only if a ∈ ϕ(X) for all a ∈ Aδ , and xy is
a blocking pair for the actual assignment MX . We define MX by setting MX (a) = M0(a) if a ∉ ϕ(X) and MX (a) = M(a) if
a ∈ ϕ(X), for each agent a. Note that by our first condition, MX is indeed an assignment. Now, as xy cannot be a blocking
pair for M or M0, either x ∈ ϕ(X) and y ∈ Aδ \ ϕ(X), or vice versa. W.l.o.g. we suppose the former. By defining y¯ ∈ V (G¯)
such that Γ (y¯) = γ (y), it can be seen that ϕ(y¯) = ymust hold because γ is nice. Thus, ϕ can be extended by adding y¯ to X .
Lemma 12. If none of the extension rules is applicable, then ϕ(X) = Aδ .
Proof. First, ϕ(X) ⊇ Cδ is trivial, as Extension Rule 1 is not applicable.
Claim 1. ϕ(X) ⊇ (H− ∪ S+) ∩ V (K1).
Suppose a ∈ (H− ∪ S+) ∩ V (K1) \ ϕ(X) is chosen such that the distance dC (a) is minimal, where dC (a) is the minimum
length of a path P in Gδ from a to some c ∈ Cδ such that the first edge of P is in E(M0) if a ∈ H and it is in E(M) if a ∈ S. If
no such path exists then let dC (a) = ∞.
First, if a is a winner single, thenM(a) ≠ ⊘, and since a andM(a) cannot be a blocking pair forM0,M(a)must be a loser
hospital. Now, ifM(a) ∈ ϕ(X) then Extension Rule 3 is applicable, a contradiction. ThusM(a) ∉ ϕ(X), but asM(a) is on the
path defining dC (a), we get dC (M(a)) < dC (a) contradicting to the choice of a. (Note that dC (a) ≠ ∞ as a ∈ V (K1).) Second,
if a is a loser hospital, thenM0(a) ≠ ⊘. Observe that ifM0(a) ∈ ϕ(X) then Extension Rule 2 is applicable, which cannot be the
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case, soM0(a) can only be a single in S \ϕ(X). IfM0(a)were a loser, then a andM0(a)would form a blocking pair forM , so we
obtainM0(a) ∈ S+\ϕ(X). But this implies dC (M0(a)) < dC (a), a contradiction. Thus,ϕ(X) indeed contains (H−∪S+)∩V (K1).
Claim 2. ϕ(X) ⊇ V (K1).
By the statement of Claim 1, we only have to prove that (H+ ∪ S−) ∩ V (K1) \ ϕ(X) is empty. Analogously as in Claim 1,
we choose a ∈ (H+ ∪ S−) ∩ V (K1) \ ϕ(X) such that the distance d′C (a) is minimal, where d′C (a) is the minimum length of
a path P in Gδ from a to some c ∈ Cδ such that the first edge of P is in E(M) if a ∈ H and it is in E(M0) if a ∈ S. If no such
path exists then let d′C (a) = ∞. Note that d′C ≠ dC , as the requirements for the first edge of the path P are different.
First, if a is a loser single, thenM0(a) ≠ ⊘, and since a andM0(a) cannot be a blocking pair forM ,M0(a)must be a winner
hospital. Now, ifM0(a) ∈ ϕ(X) then Extension Rule 2 is applicable, a contradiction. ThusM0(a) ∉ ϕ(X), but asM0(a) is on
the path defining d′C (a), we get d′C (M0(a)) < d′C (a) contradicting to the choice of a. Again, d′C (a) ≠ ∞ as a ∈ V (K1).
Second, if a is a winner hospital, then M(a) ≠ ⊘. Observe that if M(a) is a member of some couple c , then if M(c(i))
is not known for some i ∈ {1, 2}, then M(c(i)) can only be a winner hospital by Claim 1, so Extension Rules 4 and 5 is
applicable. If M(a) were a winner single, then a and M(a) would form a blocking pair for M0, so we obtain M(a) ∈ S−.
Now, if M(a) ∈ S− ∩ ϕ(X) then Extension Rule 3 is applicable. Thus, only M(a) ∈ S− \ ϕ(X) is possible. But this implies
d′C (M(a)) < d′C (a), which is a contradiction proving Claim 2.
Claim 3. ϕ(X) ⊇ V (K0).
As already mentioned, each component ofK0 is a cycle, and it easy to see that it must contain vertices from A+ and A−
in an alternating manner. Thus, if neither of Extension Rules 2 and 3 is applicable, then each component of K0 is totally
contained in either Aδ \ ϕ(X) or in ϕ(X). Thus, the first condition of Extension Rule 6 must hold. Now, if ϕ(X) ≠ Aδ then
clearly MX ≠ M . As MX is closer to M0 than M , and M is a closest solution, MX cannot be stable. Thus Extension Rule 6 is
applicable, a contradiction.
Now, Claims 1–3 together imply the lemma. 
If no extension rule is applicable, then we can easily obtain the solutionM by Lemma 12. Each step takes linear time, the
number of steps is atmost 2ℓ, and the algorithm branches into atmost (2ℓ)62ℓ(2|C |)ℓ branches in total, thus the overall run-
ning time is O(ℓ(72|C |)ℓ|I|). The output is correct if the coloring γ is nice, which holds with probability at least (2ℓ)−2ℓ. To
derandomize the algorithm, we can use the standard method of k-perfect hash functions [31] instead of randomly coloring
the vertices of G. This yields a running time of O(ℓO(ℓ)|C |ℓ|I| log |I|). 
6. Summary
We addressed the parameterized complexity of different assignment problems in models where couples can be present
in the market, considering them also in the context of local search.
First, we investigated the extension of standardmatching problems to the case where couples are involved. We obtained
a randomized fixed-parameter tractable algorithm for the Maximum Matching with Couples problem in the case where
the parameter is the number of couples (Theorem 1). We applied the presented algorithm for a problem arising in the area
of scheduling, where the task is to find aminimummakespan scheduling of jobs with processing restrictions, assuming that
the job length are in {1, p} for some integer p (Theorem 6).
We also examined the applicability of local search algorithms forMaximum Matching with Couples, and we obtained
that no permissive algorithm can run in FPT time if the parameter is the radius of the explored neighborhood, even if all
hospitals have capacity 2, unless W[1] = FPT (Theorem 7).
Next, we studied the parameterized complexity of stable assignment problems, modeling situations where the agents of
the market have preferences and may form couples. We obtained that the Hospitals/Residents with Couples problem is
W [1]-hard, if the parameter is the number of couples (Theorem8). On the onehand,we showed that no permissive algorithm
for Hospitals/Residents with Couples runs in FPT time if the parameter is the radius of the explored neighborhood, even
if all hospitals have capacity 1, unless W[1] = FPT (Theorem 10). On the other hand, we presented a strict local search
algorithm for this problem, if both the radius of the explored neighborhood and also the number of couples are parameters
(Theorem 11).
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